PART I: TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INNOVATIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZING

SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS: LEARNING STRATEGIES IN THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1866–1918☆

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ABSTRACT

We use collective learning theory to explain social movement strategic outcomes. Three movement strategies are conceptualized: insider, outsider, and generalist strategies. Generalist strategies are a combination of insider and outsider tactics. Movements learn in three main ways: retention of existing knowledge, adaptation based on past experiences, and via diffusion processes. Utilizing available data about the use of insider and outsider tactics in the state-level fight for woman suffrage, we find that state suffrage movements learned through retention of previously used strategies, adaptation in the face of major defeat, and through the diffusion of outsider tactics. Social movements exhibit structural inertia. Movement activists stick to what they know, unless they face a major

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defeat. Movement strategies are more complex and more flexible than suggested by the current focus in the social movement literature, suggesting the need to rethink the insider–outsider dichotomy.

INTRODUCTION

Social movement scholars recently have shown great interest in studying tactical repertoires and tactical choice (see Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004 for a review). Very little attention has been paid to shifts in movement strategies, and there has been less theoretical work on the evolution of strategy over time. Much social movement research (see Garner, 1997 for a review) tends to depict social movement activity as occupying a *specialist* role among political actors by relying exclusively on extrainstitutional means to accomplish collective ends. We contend, however, that social movement strategy varies and that movements may often use *generalist* strategies by attempting create change utilizing means both inside and outside the realm of institutionalized politics.

We look at changes over time in movement strategy utilizing available data about insider and outsider strategic outcomes (see McCammon, 2003). We use collective learning theory as an explanation of strategic outcome. According to this theory, movement strategy is the crystallization of knowledge stored in movement organizations and inter-personal networks about the ways to address political grievances and seek change. Movements learn in three main ways: *retention* of existing knowledge, *adaptation* based on past experiences, and via diffusion processes. We generate and test hypotheses about these three modes of learning by looking at strategic outcomes in the woman suffrage movement. Specifically, we assess how learning may have contributed to state-level movements' use of insider, outsider, and generalist strategies over a 50-year period.

MOVEMENT STRATEGIES

Utilizing theories of organizational or military strategy (see Von Clausewitz, 1968; Chandler, 1962; Pennings, 1985; Galaskiewicz & Bielefeld, 1998), we conceptualize strategy as the combination of tactics used by a social movement. Strategy need not be the product of rational actors. Organizational scholars indicate that even in hierarchical organizations strategy is not

always explicitly stated and planned. Pennings (1985) suggests that strategy is implicit and rationalized after a set of tactics have already been initiated. Seen in this way, strategies are expressions of tactical choices and posthoc rationalizations. From the perspective of social movement research, we can infer a movement's strategy based on the array of tactics utilized during a given period of time.[1] Strategic outcome is a reflection of the movement's accumulated knowledge and experience as indicated by the practice of certain tactics.

Social movement research has focused almost exclusively on tactical choice and innovation (McAdam, 1983; Ennis, 1987; McCammon, 2003; Staggenborg, 1989) and has largely ignored movement strategy (although see Freeman, 1979; Shapiro, 1985; Minkoff, 1999). Studies of tactical choice tend to focus on innovations in movement tactics. For example, McCammon (2003) examines how environmental and social movement characteristics influenced the adoption of an innovative tactic. Research looking at movement strategy has also focused on organizational change, explaining the adoption of *new* organizational strategies (Minkoff, 1999). Strategic development among a range of alternative strategies has not yet been addressed, nor has there been any research exploring strategies at the *movement level*. Noting the distinction between social movement organizations and social movements, which can consist of multiple organizations and activists, we seek to answer the following questions: What explains the use of certain strategies over other alternative strategies, and under what conditions are social movements likely to shift strategies? Do social movements learn from their failures and thus adopt new strategies? When seeking new strategies, do social movements learn from others?

INSIDER, OUTSIDER, OR GENERALIST STRATEGIES

In the study of contentious politics a number of terms have been used to describe the strategies a collectively organized group might use to affect change (see McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). *Insider* and *outsider* strategy is a common categorical scheme (Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, & Su, 1999). The insider/outsider distinction is defined by the institutional location of tactical use. Insider strategies target the institutionalized realm of the state, and outsider strategies use tactics that bypass institutionalized expressions of discontent. Outsider strategies also consist of tactics often thought of as confrontational. Insider and outsider strategies share in common the

distinction of being *specialist strategies* as they focus on a specific repertoire of tactics.

We conceptualize a third strategy – a generalist strategy – wherein movements combine both insider and outsider tactics. Movements are flexible and capable of using multiple kinds of tactics to achieve their goals. We argue that some movements utilize both insider and outsider tactics, thus developing a *generalist strategy* that covers several political and social bases at once. Movements utilizing a generalist strategy seek to simultaneously expand their range of influence inside and outside of the state. Generalist strategies demonstrate the diversity of a movement's acquired knowledge.

Surprisingly, within the social movement analytic framework there has been little systematic research investigating why movements use insider or outsider strategies (although see Soule et al., 1999). Previous research has dichotomized the concept (insider/outsider) and has not considered the possibility of generalist strategies (Soule et al., 1999). Although a broader body of political sociologists has advanced a multimodal view of political strategy (Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, & Lehmann, 1993; Banaszak, 1996; Clemens, 1997; Szymanski, 2003), social movement scholars remain focused on the outsider strategy as a form of political contention. Instead of problematizing variation in movement strategies, most movement scholars begin with the theoretical assumption that social movement actors are specialists – utilizing an outsider strategy to the exclusion of more generalist or insider approaches. These theoretical blinders may cause researchers to ignore some variation in social movement activity.

We consider the implementation of insider, outsider, and generalist strategies and attempt to link standard social movement research on strategies with the historical examination of political strategic transformation in U.S. politics (see Clemens, 1997). We ground our understanding of strategic outcomes in collective learning theory.

LEARNING MOVEMENT STRATEGIES

Strategy is a product of collective learning. Theories of collective learning (see Macy, 1990; Oliver & Myers, 2003) explain how groups store knowledge and retain memories of past experiences – successes and failures – through routines and practices found in organizations and networks (see Argote, 1999; Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner & Anderson, 1999; Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). Learning also entails acquiring new knowledge and adopting new ways of operating based on past experience

(Macy, 1990). Like other kinds of collective organization, social movements learn through interaction with their environment. We expect that movements learn strategies in three main ways: retention, adaptation, and via diffusion processes.

First, movements *retain knowledge* by establishing a stable set of tactics that are transmitted to incoming activists and then reproduced over time. Strategies tend to be replicated across time as they become normatively taken-for-granted. Minkoff (1999) suggests that strategy retention is a product of structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Social movement organizations, even at the grass roots level, develop distinct competencies that enable resource acquisition. Changing strategies disrupts legitimate routines and practices, thereby alienating some participants and forcing leaders and activists to learn new competencies. Retention involves the exploitation of extant resources and skills, rather than exploration for new resources and skills (March, 1991).

Second, movements learn through *adaptation*. Actors respond to external stimuli, such as punishments and rewards. In adaptive learning, actors follow the rule of "win-stay/lose-shift" (Macy, 1995). When an objective is obtained, change nothing; and when an objective is lost, try something new. Movements are expected to change their strategy, or at least begin looking for a new strategy, when performance aspirations are not met (Cyert & March, 1963). Examples from research on tactical innovation indicate that movements adopt new tactics as a function of adaptive learning. McCammon (2003) argued that woman suffragists adopted innovative outsider tactics in response to past legislative failures. McAdam's (1983) classic piece on tactical innovation claimed that the civil rights' movement adapted tactics in response to repression by movement opponents. The tactical choices of the civil rights movement were shaped by a kind of learning process wherein adaptation was a response to powerlessness.

Finally, movements learn by acquiring knowledge and practices from other activist networks through *diffusion* (McAdam & Rucht, 1993; Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Soule, 1997; Strang & Soule, 1998). Sometimes indirect mimicry of peers may be the cause of diffusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), but in social movements, where strong activist networks transmit information about new ideas and tactics, diffusion may also occur directly through organizational or network channels. McAdam and Rucht (1993) and Meyer and Whittier (1994) found evidence that movement practices diffused through direct contacts between organizations. Soule's (1997) study of protest against university holdings in South Africa as part of the anti-Apartheid movement demonstrated how the shantytown tactic diffused through

non-relational, or socially constructed, ties between universities. This latter kind of diffusion is a form of vicarious learning (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levitt & March, 1988; Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000). Movement actors learn from *both* mimicry of activist peers and via the direct transmission of knowledge and practices within networks.

Movements may favor retention over adaptation or adaptation over diffusion. More plausibly, movements learn strategies in multiple ways. Movements may favor retaining current strategies because to adapt may threaten the viability of the movement base (e.g. cause loss of membership or leadership). On the other hand, movements that never change may suffer debilitation if repeated or serious failures occur. Movements may adopt new strategies as a result of *adaptation* in order to reinvigorate the movement during moments of self-doubt. Movement leaders may find adaptation attractive when there are clear signs that current strategies are not working effectively. Strategies may also be adopted through *diffusion* if contacts with other organizations facilitate change.

In summary, movements are most likely to retain strategies and alter their strategies when faced with failure. Movements seek new strategies within available networks and thus diffusion is an important process of change. Strategies may be more likely to diffuse when external networks to other organizations facilitate such change.

STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT

During the 70 plus years that suffragists agitated for women's right to vote, most of the activity of the suffrage movement occurred at the state level. Of the three avenues available for adopting suffrage (by legislating an amendment followed by a referendum, via constitutional convention, or by direct democratic means such as the citizen initiative[2]), the most common and the most successful path was through the legislature.[3] Twenty-four state legislatures passed suffrage amendments (some of them did so more than once), and 11 of the subsequent referenda were successful. By 1918, 15 states had adopted woman suffrage. State suffrage movements experimented with various tactics and strategies to influence these political outcomes (Dubois, 1978, 1987; Graham, 1996; McCammon, 2003; King, Cornwall, & Dahlin, 2005).

At the state level, the tactics of the woman suffrage movement varied along the insider–outsider continuum. Some of the *outsider tactics* used by suffragists were parades, fair booths, leaflet distribution, canvassing, and voting as a form of civil disobedience. Suffragists also employed *insider tactics*, such as legislative lobbying and candidate campaigning. Fig. 1 shows the changing use of various tactics by state suffrage movements.[4] While political lobbying was the most widely used tactic, parades, fair booths, and leaflet distribution were commonly implemented. The more radical tactic of attempting to vote occurred early in the movement, but was only rarely used thereafter. Candidate campaigning became more popular in the later years of the movement. The increased use of lobbying as well as parades, fairs, and leaflets after 1890 is apparent. Added energy was brought to the movement during this period with success in four states (Utah, Wyoming, Idaho, and Colorado), the merger of AWSA (American Woman Suffrage Association) and NWSA (National Woman Suffrage Association) into the National American Woman Suffrage Association, and the leadership of a new generation of leaders like Anna Howard Shaw and Alice Stone Blackwell.

Movement strategies correspond to the kinds of tactics used. A generalist strategy is the combination of both insider and outsider tactics. Fig. 2 reports the proportion of all state movements in which one of the movement strategies was used. The proportion equals the number of movements choosing the strategy divided by the total number of active state movements.[5] In some states, activists did not report engaging in any of the discussed tactics. In years where no known strategies were used, activists may have been engaged in less publicized activities like recruitment or the movement may have been in abeyance while leaders planned a course of action and waited for new opportunities. Following Taylor (1989), we conceive of abeyance as "a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another" (p. 761).

Fig. 2 reveals a few exceptional patterns in the evolution of strategies. First, as time passed all state movements were more likely to engage in activist-oriented strategies compared to no apparent strategy. The second obvious pattern is that generalist strategies became more common in the later years. Outsider strategies emerged as insider strategies declined. But even outsider strategies peaked in the last decade of the nineteenth century as suffrage movements began using a generalist strategy. McCammon (2003) reports that certain kinds of outsider tactics, in particular the suffrage parade, became more popular among suffragists as insider tactics proved ineffective.



Fig. 1. Number of Movements using Tactic by year.



Fig. 2. Proportion of States with Active Suffragist Movements using Strategies.

DATA, STATISTICAL MODEL, AND HYPOTHESES

The data used to test the following hypotheses came from two sources. All of the social movement variables (tactics and organizational variables) were gathered by Holly McCammon, Karen Campbell, and their research team. These data were collected from secondary and primary historical sources (see in particular, Stanton, Anthony, & Gage, 1886; Harper, 1922). The authors collected legislative data from government documents. Combining both datasets provides us with information about strategic outcomes and the social, political, and legislative factors that influence their implementation. Our unit of analysis is the state. We use panel-level data, covering each year from 1866 to 1918.[6] States that adopted full woman suffrage during this time period are dropped from the analysis the following year. States enter the analysis in either 1866 or the year in which they became a territory.[7] Excluding state years during which there were no known activists or movement organization, there are 1,690 total observations.

The dependent variable, strategic outcome, was constructed using available data about specific movement tactics. The McCammon and Campbell dataset (see McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, & Mowery, 2001) provides yearly state-level information about the presence of the following tactics: political lobbying, candidate campaigning, parades, fairs, leafleting, and attempts to vote. We coded lobbying and candidate campaigning as insider tactics and parades, fairs, leafleting, and illegal voting as outsider tactics. A state movement's strategy was coded as insider if only insider tactics were used, outsider if it only outsider tactics were used, generalist if both insider and outsider tactics were used, and no apparent strategy if none of the above tactics were recorded as being used in the state during the year. The dependent variable is time varying and has four possible nominal outcomes.

We use multinomial logistic regression, a method that is useful in cases where there can be more than two possible nominal outcomes.[8] A multinomial logistic model allows us to assess the effects that independent variables have on the risk of observations resulting in one of several mutually exclusive nominal outcomes. Covariate effects are interpreted in comparison to a reference category, where a unit change in x affects the log-odds of adopting a certain strategy (insider, outsider, generalist, or no apparent strategy) versus a reference category (see Long, 1997). The coefficients from the model can be used to calculate predicted probabilities for each outcome. We can then assess how the independent variables affect the probability of each strategy's occurrence.

Because we have panel-level data, we must take into account the time invariant heterogeneity within the state. To reduce potential bias, we cluster the observations by state and obtain robust standard errors in our model estimations.[9] These provide more conservative estimates of statistical significance than would be obtained otherwise.

Retention

First we want to assess the extent to which strategic choice is shaped by retention. A movement's current strategy should reflect knowledge and expertise accumulated during the time of movement activity. Structural inertia makes movements less inclined to modify strategies.

H1. State suffrage movements will likely choose the same strategy used in the previous year.

To test this hypothesis we include in the analysis lagged variables for three strategies: insider, outsider, and generalist. The excluded lagged outcome, which serves as the reference category, is no apparent strategy.

Adaptation

We expect that movements adapt to past failures and successes. Given the prevalence of failures (it took suffragists 70 years to finally accomplish their goal), suffragists likely absorbed some of the impact of failure, making only small adjustments to their core activities. Dramatic shifts in strategy may have only followed major failures or crises, which would have sufficiently shocked the activists and spurred attempts for reform. In the suffrage movement a small, common failure would have been the loss of a single legislative bill. A major failure would have been the loss of a referendum. This meant that suffragists had previously seen a bill passed in both houses of the legislature, signed by the governor, and then put on the ballot to be decided by the voters. The ultimate defeat of a referendum usually implied that several years of hard work had resulted in defeat. Suffragists would need to start the legislative process again. The shock of a referendum loss may have caused activists to rethink their current strategy.

H2. State suffrage movements will likely change their strategy in years following a referendum loss.

We include in the analysis a dichotomous measure of referendum loss in the previous year. If a movement experienced a referendum defeat in the prior year, the variable was coded as one. No matter the path suffragists took (legislative referendum or initiative), the amendment had to pass in a referendum. Referendums required extensive movement organizing and losses were equally devastating.

To test the second hypothesis we created interaction effects between the referendum loss variable and the prior year's strategy. A negative effect of the interaction variable on the corresponding strategic outcome would indicate that a movement would be less likely to retain the same strategy after a referendum loss as they would be otherwise. That is, the loss would lessen the direct effect of the retention variable. We cannot use the "insider strategy" category in interaction with referendum defeat because there was only one case in which a movement used an insider strategy in the same year that a suffrage referendum failed. There were no years that no apparent strategy existed in the same year as a referendum defeat. Therefore, we only include one interaction effect (failed referendum * generalist strategy *or* failed referendum * outsider strategy) in the model. We run two final models (one with each interaction effect) to obtain the predicted probabilities.

Suffragists might also have adapted to cumulative failures in their attempt to gain an amendment through the legislature. While referendum defeats were rare occurrences that usually involved years of effort, individual bills were regularly introduced in many states, and therefore, the overall effect of a single bill's failure would not be as damaging. However, if suffragists continually faced defeats of legislative measures, they might have become disheartened by institutional means to success. In cases where a movement experienced a history of legislative defeats, the movement might be inclined to abandon insider strategies, and instead opt to bypass the legislature by using an outsider or generalist strategy.

H3. State suffrage movements that faced a history of legislative defeats will be less likely to use an insider strategy to attain their goals.

We include in the analysis a variable measuring the cumulative number of bills introduced in the state legislature that were subsequently defeated without moving on to a roll-call vote.[10]

From time to time, suffragists experienced incremental legislative successes. We focus on two kinds of incremental success: party endorsement and partial suffrage adoption. Although not a guarantee of legislative success, obtaining a major party's endorsement of woman suffrage in the party platform signaled to suffragists the growing acceptance and legitimation of

woman suffrage as a constitutional ideal. By acquiring party endorsements, suffragists may have perceived that insider or generalist strategies were effectively persuading institutionalized actors in the polity to support their cause. Similarly, partial woman suffrage adoption may have indicated to suffragists that legislative reform was within their grasp. By experiencing past legislative success, suffragists may have been more inclined to seek insider support and would therefore be more likely to choose an insider or generalist strategy.

H4. State suffrage movements will be more likely to choose an insider or generalist strategy once they have already obtained the endorsement of a major political party.

H5. State suffrage movements will be more likely to choose an insider or generalist strategy if the state has already adopted some form of partial suffrage.

We include two dichotomous variables indicating (1) whether a major political party endorsed woman suffrage in their platform, and (2) whether a state had previously adopted some form of partial suffrage. Conceivable forms of partial suffrage included the right to vote in municipal, school, bond, primary, and presidential elections.

Diffusion

Movements acquire strategies from other actors within their sphere of influence. That sphere includes actors with whom they share direct ties and other movements that they might mimic as a form of vicarious learning (Soule, 1997; Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Baum et al., 2000). State suffrage movements often had direct ties with national suffrage organizations like the National American Woman Suffrage Association. These national affiliations provided state movements with knowledge, organizers, financial resources, and direct access to a variety of experiences had by long-time suffrage activists (McCammon, 2001). These resources were often most influential in small state movements where local resources were scarce. Referring to assistance from the national organization during an attempted referendum, a Main suffragist leader recognized the necessity of national assistance: "Without the aid of the National American Association the campaign would have been impossible. The magnificent generosity with

which it furnished speakers, organizers, posters, and literature will make the women of Maine forever its debtors" (quoted in Harper, 1922, p. 252).

We expect that these ties provided state suffragists with the resources and information needed to develop generalist strategies. Whereas limited resources and knowledge may have forced a state movement to become specialists, the national connections enhanced their ability to expand their base of operations and allowed state suffragists to transcend the experience of their local environments to gain a more well-rounded perspective of the movement. These competencies may have translated more smoothly where the state movement organization was already well organized and designed for the transmission and learning of external knowledge. A centralized leadership structure, for example, may have aided in the diffusion of top–down knowledge by communicating information and transmitting resources from the national organization more effectively. Although suffrage movements certainly did not operate as corporations with heavy directives from top leaders, the rationalized, bureaucratic structure of many state movements may have facilitated communication and enabled the diffusion of new information and resources. Information may just as likely have been transmitted from the masses at the local level to leaders in the national organizations (see Skocpol, 2003), but the point is that the connections between these organizations allowed for the elaboration of more information and resources that facilitated the adoption of more complex, generalist strategies. Therefore, we expect that state movements that had hierarchical structures *and* national affiliations would be the most likely candidates for the transmission of knowledge and resources and their subsequent transformation into organized action.

H6. State suffrage movements with hierarchical movement organizations and organizational affiliations to a national organization will be more likely to adopt generalist strategies.

A dichotomous variable was included that indicated whether the leadership of a state movement organization was hierarchical and also had an affiliation with national movement organization. It was coded as 1 if both of these properties were present and 0 if one or both were missing. National organizations included the AWSA, the NWSA, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association.

Diffusion might also operate through mimicry of other state movements. Diffusion theorists have argued that practices tend to diffuse between actors that have perceived similarities or that share similar cultural identities (Strang & Meyer, 1993; Strang & Soule, 1998). While not all actors have

direct ties to one another, actors are more likely to monitor and mimic those they perceive as similar. We expect that movements in states from the same region are both more likely to have direct movement ties *and* are more likely to perceive themselves as similar. Both of these conditions should enhance the diffusion of strategies between movements in the same region.

> **H7.** State suffrage movements are likely to choose strategies used by other movements in their region.

To test this hypothesis we included three different strategic outcome variables. Each variable consists of the number of states in that region using one of the three strategies. For example, the regional insider strategy variable indicates the number of states (other than the state in question) in a region using an insider strategy in that particular year. We used the same regional categorization as Elazar (1984). While Elazar's work has been questioned in analyses of contemporary politics (Hero, 1998), the scheme is appropriate for the time period under study as it is constructed based on migration patterns of the day. Thus, we believe Elazar's categorization scheme had a closer fit to the actual patterns of regionalization than census categories, which changed significantly over the course of the woman suffrage campaign.

Control Variables

We control for the effects of other important indicators of strategic outcome, including organizational, political, and cultural factors. We first control for the internal capacity of the movement to mobilize resources and generate influence. Resource mobilization theorists claim that social movement action stems from the accrual of key organizational resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Soule et al. (1999) looked at the influence of internal organization on tactics but did not find a significant effect. Still, given the relative importance of resource mobilization arguments to the study of social movements, we deem it necessary to control for the effects of internal organizational capacity. The first measure we use is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a movement had a state suffrage organization. State organizations often coordinated the efforts of other clubs and organizations in the state. Movements without state organizations usually consisted of a small number of local activists or distinct suffrage clubs not organized in any formal way. To account for the organizational diversity of each state movement, we included a variable measuring the total number of suffrage organizations in a state. Presumably, movements with a great deal

of diversity would be more likely to use generalist movements because specific organizations would be able to specialize. We also expect that the sheer number of organizations in a movement would increase the likelihood that any given tactic would be used. Following McCammon (2003), we also control for the presence of inter-organizational conflict among suffrage organizations in a state movement. Movements with internal conflict are more likely to experience differentiation in tactics. This bifurcation may in turn lead to an overall generalist, albeit uncoordinated, movement strategy.

We include a measure of political openness – an index indicating a state's propensity for democratic reform. As suggested by social movement theorists, political opportunity structures influence movement strategies (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 1996; Soule et al., 1999). Our measure of political openness is based on the political openness score constructed by Clemens (1997) and measures the presence of three kinds of democratic reforms: the Australian (secret) ballot, mandatory direct primary, and popular initiative and/or referendum. Clemens' political openness variable was derived from several sources (Kettleborough, 1923; Merriam & Overacker, 1928; Ranney, 1978; Heckelman, 1995). We returned to the original sources to construct a time-varying variable.[11]

We control for changing gender relations – the gendered opportunity structure – as suggested by McCammon et al. (2001). The gendering of the public sphere was well under way and state-level differences in gender relations influenced the legislation of suffrage amendments (McCammon & Campbell, 2001). Between 1870 and 1920, middle class and working class women moved out of the domestic sphere. By 1920, one-fourth of all women employed in non-agricultural jobs were factory workers and another one-fourth were "clerks, saleswomen, stenographers, typists, bookkeepers, cashiers, and accountants" (Hill, 1929, p. 40). By 1880, two-thirds of all teachers were women; by 1920 80% were women. As a result women gained skills and developed repertoires that made them more effective movement activists. Our measure of the gendered opportunity structure is the percentage of working-age women employed in non-agricultural jobs.[12]

To account for the extent to which strategies may be shaped by the timing of legislative sessions, we included in the analysis a dummy variable indicating if a session was held that year. Finally, we include in our analysis time-period dummy variables, measured as decade intervals, to control for unobserved temporal heterogeneity and period effects. We do not include yearly dummies due to lack of degrees of freedom.

Other control variables (including measures of urbanization, female literacy rates, conflict within state movements, presence of the Women's

Christian Temperance Union, and third-party presence) were included in models not shown. These variables did not significantly improve the fit of the model and were not included in the final, trimmed model because either (1) we did not have data for the entire time period or (2) the variable introduced collinearity in the final model, which could potentially bias the efficiency of the results. Collinearity was particularly an issue for the historical variables that were only recorded at decade intervals and for which we consequently interpolated missing values. A complete table of model results is available upon request. The appendix lists correlations among all independent variables in the analysis.

RESULTS

Table 1 contains the results of a multinomial logistic model predicting movement strategic outcome. The three columns on the right report the coefficients for the model when insider strategy is the reference category. We show the results for only one of the four possible comparisons for simplicity of display. The coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: an increase in one unit of x_j increases the odds of being in category m versus being in the reference category by a multiplicative factor of $\exp\beta_{mj}$, controlling for all other covariates. For example, the coefficient for the *legislature met* variable in the second column (−1.13) indicates that in every year where a legislative session was held the odds of choosing an outsider strategy over an insider strategy decrease 68%. Suffragists were more likely to use insider strategies during years of legislative sessions.

The second column contains the χ^2 for a likelihood-ratio test when the corresponding variable was eliminated from the full model. If the χ^2 is significant, inclusion of the variable improves the fit of the model. We use the χ^2 to determine the significance of the variable rather than relying upon the significance of each individual coefficient. This is a standard approach when using multinomial logistic regression. The likelihood-ratio test is a stronger test of significance and allows us to compare the effects of a given variable across all possible outcomes (for more information see Long & Freese, 2001; for an example of the use of this method see Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003).

Table 2 summarizes the information of the multinomial logistic model in the form of predicted probabilities for each outcome. We present the predicted probabilities for outcomes in relation to changes in all statistically significant variables to facilitate interpretation. While Table 1 provides the

Table 1. Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients of Strategic Outcome.

Variable	χ^2 LR test	Outsider	Generalist	No Apparent Strategy
Intercept		0.59	−1.09	3.33
		(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.42)
Retention				
Insider strategy	139.08***	−1.89	0.14	−2.37
(lagged)		(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Outsider strategy	110.66***	2.40	1.90	−0.15
(lagged)		(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.35)
Generalist strategy	270.15***	0.005	2.17	−2.06
(lagged)		(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.37)
Adaptation				
Failed referendum	13.35**	−3.00	−1.30	0.90
(lagged)		(1.24)	(0.83)	(1.05)
Cumulative total failed bills	13.27**	−0.12	−0.05	−0.07
(lagged)		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Failed referendum * generalist	17.00***	4.16	−0.62	0.71
		(1.44)	(1.12)	(1.19)
Party endorsement	10.98*	0.20	0.43	−0.42
		(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Partial suffrage	6.53	−0.21	−0.52	0.09
law		(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Diffusion				
National affiliation-	11.58**	0.98	1.08	−0.006
hierarchical		(0.53)	(0.49)	(0.61)
Regional insider	1.94	−0.08	−0.07	0.05
(lagged)		(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Regional outsider	2.34	0.14	0.02	0.18
(lagged)		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Regional generalist	2.72	−0.13	0.01	−0.04
(lagged)		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Controls				
State suffrage organization	33.51***	−0.51	0.44	−0.95
		(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.28)
Number of other organizations	20.21***	0.009	0.008	−0.008
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Conflict	1.51	0.11	0.45	0.23
		(0.54)	(0.51)	(0.93)
Political openness	2.29	−0.001	−0.17	−0.07
		(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Women's employment	10.56*	−0.02	−0.02	−0.06
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Table 1. (*Continued*)

Variable	χ^2 LR test	Outsider	Generalist	No Apparent Strategy
Legislature met	65.28***	−1.13	−0.11	−1.25
		(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Time-period dummies				
1880s	0.51	−0.19	−0.12	0.04
		(0.38)	(0.21)	(0.27)
1890s	12.49**	1.16	0.82	0.55
		(0.37)	(0.29)	(0.35)
1900s	23.68***	1.64	1.43	0.64
		(0.49)	(0.35)	(0.40)
1910s	12.76**	1.15	1.28	0.29
		(0.57)	(0.43)	(0.54)
Number of observations		1690		

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed);
**$p < 0.01$;
***$p < 0.001$.

reader with an indication of the direct effect of each variable on strategic outcome (compared to a reference outcome), Table 2 reports the predicted probabilities for each strategy. The baseline probability is the probability a state suffrage movement uses an outsider, generalist, or no apparent strategy if all of the continuous variables are set at their mean and the dummy variables are set at zero. The rows beneath the baseline show the predicted probabilities of each strategic outcome given a change in one or more of the statistically significant independent variables. The baseline probability can be compared to the other probabilities to estimate the magnitude and direction of the independent variables' effects on the probability. So, for example, the probability of using an insider strategy changes from 0.09 to 0.44 if an insider strategy was used in the prior year and all other variables are held constant.

The results support the retention hypothesis that movements are likely to retain the same strategy used in prior years. Suffragists were much more likely to use an outsider strategy if they used an outsider strategy in the preceding year (probability equals 0.55). The same holds true for the other two strategies. Once a strategy is in place, movements are likely to continue using that strategy.

We find some support for our hypotheses about adaptation as a form of learning. Following a referendum defeat at the polls, state suffrage movements

Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Strategic Outcome.

Variable/Change in Value	Strategy/Probability			
	Insider	Outsider	Generalist	No apparent strategy
Baseline probability	0.09	0.10	0.02	0.79
Retention				
Insider strategy in prior year	0.44	0.08	0.11	0.37
Outsider strategy in prior year	0.04	0.55	0.07	0.34
Generalist strategy in prior year	0.19	0.22	0.37	0.22
Adaptation				
Failed referendum * generalist strategy	0.10	0.34	0.03	0.53
Failed referendum * outsider strategy	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.89
Cumulative. failed bills +1 s.d.	0.12	0.08	0.02	0.78
Party endorsement	0.12	0.16	0.04	0.68
Diffusion				
Nationally affiliated organization.	0.08	0.22	0.05	0.65
Controls				
State suffrage organization	0.19	0.12	0.06	0.63
Other organizations+1 s.d.	0.11	0.18	0.04	0.67
Women's employment +1 s.d.	0.12	0.12	0.02	0.74
Legislature met	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.62

are more likely to shift strategies in the following year. Suffragists using a generalist strategy were more likely to use an outsider strategy following a referendum defeat. In Table 2, the appropriate row of comparison (the baseline probability) for the interaction effect would be the retention row of the corresponding strategy. When a generalist strategy was used in the prior year, the probability of a generalist strategic outcome is 0.37, but if there was a suffrage referendum defeat in the prior year the probability of using a generalist strategy decreased to 0.03. Following a referendum defeat and the use of an outsider strategy, suffragists were more likely to use an insider strategy. This can be ascertained by observing that the probability of using an insider strategy in years in which an outsider strategy was used previously is 0.04 and that this probability increases to 0.06 if a referendum was defeated in the same prior year.[13] Under the same circumstances, the probability of using an outsider strategy decreases from 0.55 to 0.03. The probability of having no apparent strategy increases in years following a referendum failure, regardless of the prior strategy used. Taken together, these results suggest that strategic adaptation is most likely following the

loss of a referendum. This corresponds with McCammon's (2003) finding that political defeats increased the likelihood of suffragists adopting a novel tactic; however, the idea put forward here is more general. Movements that suffer major defeats often reorganize their efforts – sometimes innovating but sometimes shrinking back the scale of their efforts.

Because referendum defeats are a particularly shocking form of failure, the defeats created temporary crises in many state movements. Only a few states were able to regroup, as New York did in 1915, and engage new strategies immediately after defeat. In most cases, a failed referendum set state-level efforts back several years. This was especially true in the early history of the movement when amendments were often soundly defeated. For instance, in 1887 a referendum was defeated in Rhode Island by a vote of 6,889–21,957. Historical records indicate that "after having been defeated by so heavy a vote, it was deemed best not to ask for another submission of the question for a term of years" (Anthony & Harper, 1902, p. 911). State movements in situations like this likely reassessed their methods and initiated searches for new means of influence (March, 1991). Such a shift may have, in fact, led to momentary abeyance (Taylor, 1989) as movement actors took time to redefine their strategy. Evidence shows that abeyance occurred in about a quarter of referendum defeats. The data suggest the average length of this abeyance was 4 years.

Contrary to expectations, we find that state suffrage movements were *more* likely to use insider strategies after experiencing a history of legislative defeats. Although the effect is relatively small, compared to the coefficients of the other adaptation variables, this is still an unexpected finding. Rather than move away from a strategy that apparently provided little success, suffragists in fact were more likely to embrace this strategy. The probability of using an insider strategy increases from 0.09 to 0.12 as the number of cumulative legislative defeats moves one standard deviation above the mean. The probability of using the other two strategies remains roughly the same or decreases with changes in cumulative legislative defeats. In the face of legislative failure, suffragists may have viewed an insider strategy as having *almost* succeeded rather than as defeat and, therefore, continued using the same strategy. Another possible explanation is that suffragists were satisfied enough that they attained moderate success (getting bills introduced and moved to a roll-call vote) that they felt committed to insider strategies.

We find some, but not overwhelming, support for the proposition that previous successes cause movements to adapt their strategies. State suffrage movements were more likely to choose an insider or generalist strategy if

they received the endorsement of a major political party, but they were also more likely to use an outsider strategy. This indicates that party endorsements increased the odds of using *any* of the strategies, and decreased the odds of having no apparent strategy. State suffrage movements were no more likely to use an insider or generalist strategy if the state had previously adopted a partial suffrage law, as indicated by the χ^2 result's lack of significance (Table 1).

The model found some support for the diffusion argument. We found that state movements with national affiliations were about twice as likely to use a generalist strategy (see Table 2). The probability of using an outsider strategy, however, also increased from 0.10 to 0.22. This indicates that affiliation with a national organization encouraged local suffragists to use outsider tactics rather than insider tactics. We found no evidence for the second kind of diffusion – mimicry of other state movements. State suffrage movements were no more likely to use a strategy if other movements in their region were also using that strategy.

Four control variables significantly affected strategy. The presence of a state suffrage organization greatly increases the probability of using all strategies, although it most strongly influences insider strategy (changing the probability from 0.09 to 0.19) and generalist strategy (changing the probability from 0.02 to 0.06). Movements with more suffrage organizations are also more likely to use any of the strategies, although the greatest effect is on the use of outsider and generalist strategies. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of employed women also positively affects the use of all three strategies. Insider and generalist strategies were also more commonly used in years when legislatures met. This indicates that tactics like lobbying and candidate campaigning were partly a response to opportunities to influence legislators' opinions about suffrage.

STRATEGIC OUTCOMES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In summary, the findings suggest that the strategies implemented by state woman suffrage movements were primarily learned through the retention of previously used strategies, adaptation in the face of major defeat, and through the diffusion of outsider tactics from affiliated organizations. We also find effects for adaptive learning as a result of accumulated failures and party endorsement, but these effects are not as large. Social movements exhibit structural inertia. Movement activists stick to what they know, unless they face a major defeat. Failure increases the probability that activists

will change their strategy. Moreover, movements are not immune to outside influence; their strategies are shaped by affiliation with other organizations.

Strategy and Tactics Revisited

Although we focus on strategy in this paper, we want to make clear that strategies emerge from tactical choices. As noted earlier in the paper, most social movement research has focused on tactical choice or repertoires (e.g. McAdam, 1983; Ennis, 1987; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2003), often ignoring strategy or even substituting strategy as another term for tactic. We contend that strategy is a core feature of the social form[14] known as the social movement. Societal actors recognize social movements, and thus label them as such, by their repertoire of activities. For this reason understanding variation in strategy is an important component of the social movement research agenda.

Future research should look at the relationship between these two levels of movement activism. While we have mainly used tactics as a way to get at the emerging strategic outcome, movement researchers should also be interested in how tactical choice shapes the actual strategic language of a movement. The relationship of strategy and tactic is largely dialogical. Strategy should be apparent in other realms of movement activity, including the framing and discourse of the movement. Future research might explore the connections between strategy, tactics, and framing.

The Insider–Outsider Continuum

By examining changes in strategic outcomes over the entire history of the suffrage movement, we connect two scholarly literatures that have examined changes in political activism in the U.S. On the one hand, the social movement analytic framework (see Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 1996) often conceptualizes political activism as extrainstitutional. Social movements are seen as specialists in the political sphere that gain recognition by their distinct status as outsiders. On the other hand, political scientists and sociologists studying civic associations and new political lobbies at the turn of the century have emphasized the extent to which marginalized actors utilized a variety of tactics, ranging from the extrainstitutional to the more conventional (see Buechler, 1986; Skocpol, 1992; Skocpol et al., 1993; Szymanski, 2003). Rather than being fixed, the organizational repertoires of

political activists vary extensively over time and space (Clemens, 1997; Ferree et al., 2002).

This study reveals that movement strategies are more complex and more flexible than often thought, suggesting the need to rethink the insider–outsider dichotomy. McAdam and Snow (1997) state that social movements consist of at least five elements: "(1) collective or joint action; (2) change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of organization; (4) some degree of temporal continuity; and (5) some extrainstitutional collective action, or at least a mixture of extrainstitutional (protesting in the streets) and institutional (political lobbying) activity" (p. xvii). The element that sets social movements apart from other kinds of interest organizations in the eyes of many sociologists is an outsider strategy (for examples see Burstein, Einwohner, & Hollander, 1995; Minkoff, 1999). We suggest that definitions of social movements that rely on the presence of extrainstitutional strategy should be reconsidered. Interest groups and social movements may be more similar than different (Burstein, 1999).

Distinctions between interest organizations and social movement organizations should be considered problematic rather than assumed a priori. In addition, scholars should pay attention to the broad range of activities that take place within any given movement, recognizing that not all movements are specialists. In fact, in a resource-rich society such as ours where actors may use multiple paths of influence, most movements may be generalists. The presence (and perhaps prevalence) of generalist movements challenges the basic categories that dominate much of the social movement literature.

Breaking down social movement behavior into a broader range of strategic outcomes expands the research agenda for sociologists interested in studying all kinds of political behavior. Doing so pushes the research agenda in at least three directions. First, other social movement researchers may be interested in further analyzing strategic outcome as a dependent variable. Clearly, we have not exhausted all of the dimensions by which strategies may be differentiated. Future research need not be limited to insider, outsider, and generalist strategies; rather, future research can expand our knowledge about the breadth of strategies that movements utilize. Second, researchers may look at what causes organizations that we typically classify as interest groups to develop generalist strategies. What causes groups built to operate in the institutionalized space of the state (such as professional lobbying organizations) to diversify their strategy? And third, breaking down the classification scheme should lead to further cross-germination between political science and sociology. Given the vast amount of research that has accumulated in political science on interest group lobbying

(see Baumgartner & Leech, 1998), sociologists might benefit from looking more closely at this literature, particularly as the interests of social movement researchers focuses more on outcomes and political change (see Giugni, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999). Further, by speaking to issues of interest to political scientists, sociologists can demonstrate that lobbying is not the only effective strategy for affecting policy change. Outsider tactics occupy an important and key position in contemporary American politics.

Learning and Strategic Outcomes

We have argued that social movements learn strategies. We looked at how various factors internal to the social movement and in the movement's learning environment lead to the use of one strategy among a range of alternatives. Movements learn through interaction with the environment and through direct contact with other actors, organizations, and movements. Knowledge is stored in movements' organizations and networks and is adapted to deal with major failures or expanded to include new practices diffused via organizational linkages.

We have presented learning as occurring through three main channels: retention, adaptation, and via diffusion processes. However, it is probably more realistic to consider the inter-dependent nature of these processes. As stated in the introduction, these processes may be occurring simultaneously, and as a reviewer for this paper suggested, the processes may often be intertwined. For example, movement actors may mimic a new strategy of a movement in a neighboring state as a form of adaptation. The challenge for the scholar of political action is to find the appropriate methods to model these processes. Given the complexity of social learning, the purpose of the paper was to identify those processes, make predictions as to their effects on strategic outcome, and to statistically model those net effects. Future research, however, might explore the combinatorial nature of these avenues for learning. In particular, scholars should think about the ways in which adaptation occurs as the result of both experimental innovations within movements and by mimicry of strategies from other movements.

Another important aspect of learning that should be considered is the extent to which movements are related, cooperative, and potential models for mimicry. In models not shown, we included the presence of the national temperance organization (the WCTU) as an independent variable to ascertain to what extent the presence of a closely related movement influenced state suffrage movements. While this crude measure was not statistically

significant, it is highly unlikely that specific tactics did not disseminate between the movements given the degree of overlap in movement memberships. Unfortunately, we do not have a time-varying measure of state temperance organizations' strategies. Future research should continue to explore the extent to which movement strategies are inter-related and examine corresponding fluctuations in movement forms.

A note of caution should be offered concerning the normative nature of the learning concept. Often we conceive of learning as leading to progress and improvement. However, learning does not necessarily lead to desirable outcomes. While sometimes movements may learn how to improve their strategies to better accomplish their objectives, the opposite outcome is always possible. Just as individuals learn useful knowledge and practices, they are also capable of learning bad habits, ineffective behaviors, or incorrect information. Social movements are no different. Learning does not always produce optimal outcomes.

Social movements may learn, through experiences with their environment, ineffective strategies and tactics that hinder their success. While our present study did not examine the effect of the different strategic outcomes on goal attainment, some of our findings suggest that ineffective learning is a real possibility. Because movements are characterized by structural inertia, ineffective strategies may persist for quite some time, despite evidence indicating that the strategy is not producing the desired outcome. In fact, as long as a current strategy appears to be minimally effective (as in the case of state suffragists that experienced a history of legislative defeats), social movements may persist in using the same strategy.

Learning, then, should be seen as a process that occurs continuously but that does not necessarily lead to improvement or even change. Learning does however ensure the survival of the movement. Movements cease to learn when they can no longer replicate past tactics or produce new tactics. Although abeyance was often a response to major defeats, sustainable movements were able to regroup and establish a new strategy or resolve to pursue the same strategy in future campaigns. The eventual success of the woman suffrage movement attested to their ability to learn strategies and to carry on the fight even in the face of stiff cultural and political opposition.

NOTES

1. Movement strategy is conceptually different from the tactical repertoires described by Tilly (1978). While a movement's tactical repertoire consists of all of the

tactics that a movement knows how to use, a strategy consists of the tactics that a movement puts to actual use. A repertoire then is more of a cultural template for movement activity, and strategy can be inferred from the observable action of that movement.

2. For more information on direct democracy and avenues of constitutional change (see Ranney, 1978; Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989; Bowler, Donovan, & Tolbert, 1998).

3. Of the 55 referenda held between 1867 and 1919, 40 (73%) were the result of legislated amendments. The others were the result of initiative and referenda (8) or constitutional conventions (7).

4. Note that picketing was not included on this chart because picketing was only used for 2 years of the movement's history. By comparison, women attempted to vote 71 times.

5. We determine that a state movement was active by the presence of at least one known activist or movement organization in the state during that year.

6. Data limitations do not allow for analysis earlier than 1866. The final year of the analysis is 1918 because in the following year Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave all women the right to vote. Including 1919 in our analysis might have biased results due to the sudden change in movement strategy.

7. Some states have missing data points and these years for those states are excluded from the analysis. For example, we were forced to censor Arizona from 1866 to 1880 due to missing data. We conducted sensitivity analyses, excluding the variable for which the data were missing, to ensure our estimates were not biased by the exclusion of those years. There were no substantial differences between the models.

8. Multinomial logistic models assume the "independence of irrelevant alternatives," meaning that no other possible alternative nominal outcomes exist that are statistically correlated with those in the dependent variable. Using a Hausman test to assess this assumption, we found support for the null hypothesis that alternative outcomes are independent from those in the model.

9. Coefficients are specified using the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance.

10. There are many ways that a bill can be defeated in the legislative process. A bill often simply died in committee and was never brought to a vote. Such defeats may have been exceptionally threatening to the suffragists' trust in elected officials because it was indicative of their own impotence to influence change.

11. We only use three of the four indicators used in the original political openness measure proposed by Clemens. She included whether or not the state had granted women the right to vote.

12. This is measured as the difference between the number of women working in agriculture and the total number of working women, divided by the total number of women over the age of 10. As one reviewer noted, this variable is also related to cross-state differences in economic opportunities. Clearly, the changing gender relations and the economic transformations of the woman suffrage era are related, but without more precise measurements of gendered attitudes and practices we are not able to parse this effect more efficiently.

13. Note that the outsider * failed referendum interaction measure is not included in the model in Table 1. As mentioned earlier in the paper, this is because we cannot

include both interaction effects in the same model because we lack enough cases where movements used insider or no apparent strategy and also experienced referendum defeat.

14. We refer to Simmel (1971) conception of a social form as a generalizable pattern of association between social actors.

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APPENDIX. CORRELATION TABLE OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1. Insider – lagged	1																				
2. Outsider – lagged	−0.16	1																			
3. Generalist – lagged	−0.30	−0.24	1																		
4. Failed referendum	−0.05	0.06	0.12	1																	
5. Cumulative total failed bills	0.04	−0.02	0.30	0.13	1																
6. Failed referendum * generalist	−0.05	−0.04	0.17	0.84	0.14	1															
7. Failed referendum * outsider	−0.03	0.18	−0.04	0.50	0.03	−0.01	1														
8. Party endorsement	−0.01	0.02	0.31	0.12	0.31	0.14	0.01	1													
9. Partial suffrage	0.08	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.26	0.08	0.08	0.19	1												
10. National affiliation/hierarchical	−0.04	−0.001	0.23	0.05	0.25	0.05	0.01	0.21	0.10	1											
11. Regional insider – lagged	0.49	−0.10	−0.11	−0.01	0.04	0.01	−0.04	0.03	0.13	−0.01	1										
12. Regional outsider – lagged	−0.11	0.47	−0.01	0.02	0.09	−0.02	0.08	0.01	0.09	−0.002	−0.20	1									
13. Regional generalist – lagged	−0.09	−0.01	0.58	0.13	0.31	0.13	0.03	0.31	0.27	0.27	−0.13	−0.01	1								
14. State suffrage organization	0.15	0.14	0.44	0.08	0.31	0.07	0.05	0.26	0.30	0.18	0.13	0.19	0.46	1							
15. Political openness	−0.05	−0.05	0.29	0.14	0.27	0.12	0.08	0.22	0.13	0.21	−0.13	0.11	0.52	0.35	1						
16. Women's employment	0.16	0.04	0.11	0.13	0.36	0.09	0.10	0.24	0.44	0.09	−0.22	0.11	0.21	0.24	0.03	1					
17. Legislature met	−0.09	0.01	0.01	0.05	−0.03	0.05	0.04	−0.04	−0.06	−0.04	−0.11	0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.04	−0.19	1				
18. 1880s	0.08	−0.11	−0.20	−0.04	−0.18	−0.03	−0.03	−0.12	−0.09	−0.09	0.18	−0.23	−0.33	−0.26	−0.37	−0.04	0.02	1			
19. 1890s	0.03	0.07	−0.01	−0.02	−0.05	−0.02	0.001	0.03	0.08	−0.05	0.07	0.14	−0.02	0.14	0.004	0.02	−0.05	−0.28	1		
20. 1900s	−0.08	0.13	0.05	−0.03	0.14	−0.05	0.02	−0.08	0.14	−0.10	−0.16	0.27	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.09	−0.05	−0.27	−0.28	1	
21. 1910s	−0.06	0.01	0.33	0.14	0.33	0.14	0.05	0.35	0.15	0.38	−0.11	0.02	0.54	0.25	0.50	0.18	−0.07	−0.24	−0.24	−0.24	1